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ABSTRACT
Most of agents that learn policy for tasks with reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) lack the ability to communicate with people, which makes
human-agent collaboration challenging. We believe that, in order
for RL agents to comprehend utterances from human colleagues,
RL agents must infer the mental states that people attribute to them
because people sometimes infer an interlocutor’s mental states
and communicate on the basis of this mental inference. This pa-
per proposes PublicSelf model, which is a model of a person who
infers how the person’s own behavior appears to their colleagues.
We implemented the PublicSelf model for an RL agent in a sim-
ulated environment and examined the inference of the model by
comparing it with people’s judgment. The results showed that the
agent’s intention that people attributed to the agent’s movement
was correctly inferred by the model in scenes where people could
find certain intentionality from the agent’s behavior.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The development of reinforcement learning (RL) makes it possible
to create agents that are capable of learning how to act instead
of being programmed by designers. Because RL agents can obtain
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Figure 1: Example of the scenario considered in this paper.
The utterance of the person to the robot is based on themen-
tal states attributed to the robot by the person. The robot
needs to estimate the attributed mental states in order to
comprehend the person’s utterance.
policy by learning, it is possible to realize adaptive agents that
work on tasks by trial and error. In particular, with the introduction
of deep learning, RL is expected to be applied to agents such as
industrial and domestic robots that act in the complex real world.
In general, however, collaboration between people and RL agents
has many problems. Natural language is one of the major media
allowing people to interact with others. Thus, developing a mecha-
nism for RL agents to comprehend people’s utterances is an impor-
tant step toward realizing human-friendly RL agents.
Many previous studies have focused on autonomous agents that
comprehend people’s utterances [4, 11]. While people often use
expressions that cannot be understood out of context, Sonja [2] is
an agent that can comprehend such context-dependent expressions.
Figure 1 shows an example scenario of the situation considered
in this paper. There are a robot and its colleague. The colleague
has an apple and a pear, while the robot has only an apple. The
robot moves toward the back side, and the colleague says to the
robot, "Hey, you can get this." If we were the robot, we would think
the colleague was talking about the pear he had, and not about the
apple. We can interpret the utterance because we can infer that the
colleague thinks the robot has a certain mental state even if the
robot does not actually have suchmental states as what people have,
and therefore assumes that "The robot intends to get a pear" and
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"The robot does not want an apple anymore." Therefore, in order to
comprehend the person’s utterance, the robot also has to infer the
person’s inference about the robot. In other words, the robot needs
to infer how its behavior appears to the others. Sonja’s system
assumes that the knowledge of Sonja’s action target is shared with
the colleague, and does not consider the mental inference by the
colleague.
In this paper, we propose PublicSelf model. PublicSelf model is a
model of a person that infers another’s inference of the person’s
mental state. We also implemented the PublicSelf model for an RL
agent in a simulated environment. Implementation experiments
showed that the model could estimate a human observer’s inference
of the person’s intention in scenes where people could discern a
certain intentionality from the agent’s behavior.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes and for-
malizes the settings of the problem, and presents the background
of the PublicSelf model. Section 3 proposes the PublicSelf model.
Section 4 describes our implementation of the PublicSelf model for
an agent in a simulated environment, and shows some examples of
the model’s inferences. Section 5 describes an experiment to com-
pare the inference of the PublicSelf model with a human observer’s
judgment. Finally, section 6 concludes this paper.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Mind-reading in human conversation
Theory of mind is the ability to read minds, attributing a mental
state such as a belief, a desire, a plan, or an intention to someone so
as to understand and predict their behavior [15]. Mind-reading is
considered to be one of the important elements for achieving social
interaction.
We sometimes mind-read an interlocutor and communicate on
the premise that the interlocutor has the mental state we infer. For
example, [13] showed that people could understand the content of
a robot’s unclear utterance by considering the intention that they
attributed to the robot. In the example given in section 1, the person
watches the behavior of the robot and attributes its intention to
get a pear. Thus, the person says "You can get this" based on the
attributed mental state. We, on the other hand, can comprehend the
person’s utterance by inferring the intention the person attributes
to the robot and assuming that the person intends to help the robot.
As seen here, people sometimes regard the results of mind-reading
as the context when talking and interpreting someone’s utterance
whether or not the interlocutor actually has mental states like
people.
We formalize the process of people’s thinking in the example sce-
nario given in section 1 using Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) logic [3].
Here, we call the person an observer, and the robot an actor. The
utterance of the observer is based on the idea that the actor has
intention ι1.
(BEL observer (INTEND actor ι1)), (1)
where (BEL i ϕ) means agent i believes ϕ, and (INTEND i, ϕ)
means agent i intends to achieve ϕ. The superscript 1 of ι1 indicates
that the variable is an inference of another person’s mental state.
The observer infers intention ι1 from the set of possible inten-
tions for actor. The observer chooses ι1 based on observations o:t
and the actor’s actions a:t at time 0, 1, ..., t . In the example of sec-
tion 1, the observer can be considered to attribute intention ιp , the
intention to get a pear.
ιa = (get actor apple). (2)
ιp = (get actor pear). (3)
In order for the actor to comprehend the observer’s utterance, the
actor has to infer the intention attributed to them by the observer.
The inference is based on the actor’s own observations and actions.
Let ι2 be the intention the actor infers that the observer attributes
to them. The superscript 2 means that the variable is an inference
of the self’s mental state attributed by others.
(BEL actor (BEL observer (INTEND actor ι2))). (4)
Moreover, the actor assumes that the observer’s utterance was
based on the observer’s intention to help the actor.
(BEL actor (INTEND observer (DONE actor ι2))), (5)
where (DONE i ϕ) means that agent i has just achieved ϕ.
We can consider formula 5 to represent that the actor trusts the
observer. If the actor assumes the observer intends to obstruct the
actor, formula 5 is changed to formula 6.
(BEL actor (INTEND observer (DONE actor ¬ι2))). (6)
In either case, the actor can interpret the observer’s utterance by
choosing the interpretation that supports formula 5 or 6. Conversely,
the actor needs to be able to infer ι2 in order to interpret utterances
based on the speaker’s mind-reading.
2.2 Adaptive action selection of reinforcement
learning agents by considering people’s
utterance
Our final goal is to propose a mechanism of RL agents that can
adaptively select actions by considering people’s utterances. Adap-
tive action selection by RL agents involves not only comprehending
context-dependent expressions from people, but also considering
whether or not the agents should change their policy on the basis
of people’s utterances.
Understanding the internal states of an RL agent, such as their
goals, plans, beliefs, desires, and intentions, is a challenging problem
because the agent does not have explicit representations for them.
This problem becomes a more important domain of research with
the introduction of deep learning [9]. The incomprehensibility of
RL agents also raises the problem of the RL agent determining how
to act while taking people’s utterances into account.
Sonja [2] is an artificial agent which can comprehend an context-
dependent expression such as "No, the other one." If Sonja’s observer
says "No, the other one" when Sonja moves to an amulet, Sonja will
begin searching for another amulet, or when Sonja moves toward
a ladder, Sonja will change its direction to another ladder.
When Sonja receives the message "No, the other one," its control
logic handles the message by changing Sonja’s target to another
one. Sonja’s approach is based on two assumptions: (i) The observer
knows what the actor is going to do, and (ii) The actor knows what
the actor is going to do.
Suppose an actor is choosing actions based on intention ι∗.
(INTEND actor ι∗). (7)
The superscript ∗ indicates that the variable is an agent’s actual
internal state.
An observer speaks to an actor based on ι1, the inference of the
actor’s intention. If the actor’s decision making process is explicit, it
is reasonable to consider that the observer’s inference matches the
actor’s true intention (ι1 = ι∗) because it is not very difficult for the
observer to access the actor’s actual internal states. However, when
it comes to an RL agent, it is difficult for a human observer to access
the agent’s internal states embedded in the agent’s policy. We do
not even know whether the policy of an RL agent has what we
call intention. What the observer can do is only to infer the actor’s
intention from knowledge, context, and observations of the actor’s
behavior. Thus, the observer may speak based on a false belief that
the agent has intention ι1(, ι∗). If the observer is misinterpreting
the actor’s intention, the actor may as well not take the observer at
their word.
In addition, an RL agent also does not know ι∗ explicitly. There-
fore, the actor cannot judge whether the observer’s belief on the
actor is correct.
In order to realize RL agents that can adaptively select actions
by considering people’s utterances, an RL agent should be able to
infer two intentions, ι2 and ι0. ι0 is the introspective inference of
the agent’s intention by the agent.
(BEL actor (INTEND actor ι0)). (8)
The superscript 0 indicates that the variable is a self inference of
their own mental states.
ι2 helps the agent interpret the observer’s utterance, and a com-
parison between ι2 and ι0 enables the agent to judge whether what
the observer says has value.
2.3 Self-awareness
In the field of psychology, self-awareness is the ability of people to
recognize the self as an object of attention [5].
Self-awareness is considered to have two aspects: public self-
awareness and private self-awareness [6, 7]. Private self-awareness
is a personal belief in the self acquired by the introspection of self
thoughts and feelings. Public self-awareness, on the other hand,
is a belief in the self as a social object, and involves how the self
appears to others.
The idea of self-awareness can be associated with the self infer-
ences of an actor’s intention:
• Private self-awareness is the inference of the self’s actual
mental states, and involves the inference of ι0.
• Public self-awareness is the inference of the self’s mental
states attributed by an observer, and involves the inference
of ι2.
We believe that RL agents need to be self-aware in these twoways
to determine their actions while considering people’s utterances.
The PublicSelf model can be considered a model of public self-
awareness for RL agents.
2.4 Bayesian modeling of theory of mind
Previous studies have modeled the computational mechanisms of
the human mind-reading ability as a Bayesian inference (Fig. 2
left) [1, 8, 14]. In this paper, we collectively call these approaches the
Bayesian Theory of Mind (BToM). One of the targets in the BToM
research field is modeling a human observer who attributes mental
states to an actor while watching the actor’s behavior. In a typical
problem setting, an observer can observe the whole environment,
including the actor in the environment, and attributes mental states
such as the actor’s belief b1t , desire r1t , and intention ι1t based on the
environment states s:t and the actor’s actions a:t at time 0, 1, ..., t .
Each variable of the mental states can be estimated as a probability.
P(b1t , r1t , ι1t |s:t ,a:t )
∝ Σo1t ,b1t−1,r 1t−1, ι1t−1P(o
1
t |st ) · P(b1t |o1t ,b1t−1) · P(at |b1t , ι1t )
· P(ι1t |b1t , r1t−1, ι1t−1) · P(st |st−1,at−1)
· P(b1t−1, r1t−1, ι1t−1 |s:t−1,a:t−1),
(9)
where o1 is an observation that the observer infers the actor ob-
serves at time t . The probability of each variable can be calculated
using a forward algorithm [16]. The PublicSelf model is based on
the BToM concept.
We can consider the BToM to be a model of an observer who
monitors an actor’s behavior and the proposed PublicSelf model
to be a model of an actor that infers an observer’s inference of
the actor’s intention. While the inference of the BToM is based on
a third-person’s perspective of an observer, the PublicSelf model
infers an actor’s mental states attributed by the observer from the
actor’s own perspective. The intention which the BToM model
infers is ι1, and that of the PublicSelf model is ι2.
3 BAYESIAN PUBLIC SELF-AWARENESS
MODEL
This paper proposes PublicSelf model. The PublicSelf is a Bayesian
inference model of public self-awareness and estimates the proba-
bility of an actor’s mental states attributed by an observer.
Figure 2 shows the Bayesian networks of the BToM model and
the PublicSelf model. In the BToM, observable variables are states
of the environment s and actions of the actor a. However, because
the PublicSelf model focuses on the inference by the actor, the
observable variables are only what the actor can observe, that is,
the observations of the actor o and actions a. The observer and actor
observe the environment based on their own limited observation
spaces.
The probabilities of the actor’s attributed belief b2t , desire r2, and
intention ι2t can be estimated in a manner similar to that for the
BToM:
P(b2t , r2t , ι2t |o:t ,a:t )
∝ Σst ,o1t ,o2t ,b2t−1,r 2t−1, ι2t−1P(ot |st ) · P(o
1
t |st ) · P(o2t |o1t ) · P(b2t |o2t ,b2t−1)
· P(at |b2t , ι2t ) · P(ι2t |b2t , r2t−1, ι2t−1) · P(st |st−1,at−1)
· P(b2t−1, r2t−1, ι2t−1 |o:t−1,a:t−1).
(10)
Figure 2: Difference between Bayesian networks for typical
BToMmodel (left) and PublicSelf model (right). The subject
of the BToMmodel is an observer, and the object is an actor.
In the case of the PublicSelfmodel, the relationship between
the subject and the object is reversed. The gray colored circle
indicates that the variable is observable to the subject, while
white means it is hidden. The superscript numbers of each
variable have the following meanings: 1 means that the sub-
ject attributes the variable to the object, and 2 means that
the subject estimates the variable attributed to the subject
by the object.
The crucial point of the PublicSelf model is to consider the asym-
metry of the information between an actor and an observer. For
example, even if an actor observes an apple and moves toward it,
the observer cannot read the actor’s intention unless the observer
can observe both the actor and the apple. The PublicSelf model
emulates how the behavior of the actor appears to the observer in
order to infer the mental states attributed by the observer.
4 IMPLEMENTATION FOR RL AGENT IN
SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT
4.1 Simulated environment
This paper introduces an implementation of the PublicSelf model
for an RL agent (Fig. 3b) in a simulated environment (Fig. 3a). In the
environment considered, there are always five objects: two apples,
two pears, and the agent (actor). The objects spawn at random loca-
tions at the beginning of each episode. The actor selects its action
based on observation from a first-person view camera (Fig. 3c). The
action space of the actor consists of five actions: moving forward,
moving backward, turning clockwise, turning counterclockwise,
and doing nothing.
(a)
(b) (c) (d)
Figure 3: Simulated environment. (a) Bird’s eye view of en-
tire field. (b) Visual appearance of the agent (actor). (c) First-
person view of the actor. (d) First-person view of the ob-
server. The observable area of the observer is limited to the
center of the field.
4.2 Implementation
In the current implementation, we did not calculate all of the prob-
abilities in equation 10; some were updated deterministically. We
assumed that the observer observed the environment from a prede-
fined fixed viewpoint (Fig. 3d), and that the actor knew the area of
the observer’s view. The view of the actor assumed by the observer
was also predefined by the angle of view and distance from the
front of the actor.
Environmental state s consists of the velocity and direction of
the actor and the locations of the objects on the field. Belief b(s)
is the probability that the environment state is s under the actor’s
observable variables (o and a).
b(s) = P(s |o:t ,a:t ) (11)
We assume that both the actor and observer know there are
always two apples and two pears on the field, and consider that
there are two possible desires attributed by the observer to the
actor: ra and rp .
ra =

1.5 if the actor touches an apple
−1.5 if the actor touches a pear
−0.002 else
(12)
rp is constituted by replacing the apple and pear of ra . We also
assume that there are two possible intention: ιa and ιp . We assume
that desires ra and rp respectively generate intentions ιa and ιp ,
that is, P(ιa |ra ) = P(ιp |rp ) = 1.
The states of the simulation environment s are continuous, so
there are infinite possible worlds. For the calculation, we reduce
the possible states by considering the environment to be a grid
world with seven rows and twenty-five columns. The number of
possible combinations where the fruits locate can be located is(
175
2
)
×
(
173
2
)
= 226, 517, 550.
Belief b2 is initialized as the uniform probability distribution of
all the possible states, and updated by rejecting states that contra-
dict the observations overlapped between the actor and the observer.
This means that the observer updates the belief attributed to the ac-
tor only if the observer can see what the actor observes. If the actor
passes by an apple to the right, disappears from the observer’s view
for a while, and returns, people can infer that there are no pears in
the right unobservable field, but this deterministic implementation
cannot handle this kind of inference.
Equation 10 has an element P(a |b2t , ι2t ), which is the probability
of selecting action a under an actor’s intention ι2t and belief b2t . We
need to calculate the possibilities under various possible intentions
and beliefs, but the actor’s own policy, which handles first-person
view observations as input, makes it hard to emulate various possi-
bilities. Therefore, we prepared another policy πmeta , whose input
is not visual images but numerical vectors consisting of the actor’s
velocity and the relative position between the actor and the fruits
using A3C, which is a deep reinforcement learning method [12].
πmeta calculates probability of choosing each action under certain
belief, reward, and intention P(a |b, ι).
4.3 Intention estimation by implemented
PublicSelf model
We verified the inference of an RL agent’s intention using the
PublicSelf model. The actor has two policies, πa , which was learned
to move to apples with A3C, and πp to move to pears.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the conditions and estimated proba-
bilities of the actor’s intentions by the PublicSelf model in three
episodes. The actor’s policy was πa in episodes 1 and 3, and πp in
episode 2.
In episode 1, the actor showed a behavior that made it relatively
simple for an observer to infer the actor’s intention. The actor first
faced to the bottom left, turned counterclockwise, and moved to an
apple. Suppose youwere the observer inferring the actor’s intention.
You could not judge the actor’s intention while the actor is turning,
and would think the actor intended to get an apple after the actor
began to move forward toward the right apple. The probability of
the intention inferred by the PublicSelf model rapidly increased
when the actor began to move forward, which seemed to meet our
intuitive image.
In episode 2, the actor showed misleading behavior. The actor
moved toward the apples even though the actor’s actual target was
the pears. Then, the actor changed its direction to the right and
disappeared from the observer’s sight. The PublicSelf model first
estimated that it was more likely that the actor intended to get
apples, and then greatly decreased the probability when the actor
turned its back on the apples.
In episode 3, the observer obtained very poor information. The
actor actually observed two pears and an apple in their view, and
moved toward the apple. However, because the observer could not
observe what the actor was moving toward, the observer could
not infer the actor’s intention. The actor needed to consider the
asymmetry of the information between the actor and the observer
(a) t = 1 (observer’s perspective) (b) t = 13
(c) t = 18 (d) probability
Figure 4: The actor’s behavior and the probability of the ac-
tor’s intention ι2 were estimated by the PublicSelf model in
episode 1.Here, the actor showedmovement thatmade it rel-
atively simple for an observer to infer the actor’s intention.
(a) First, the actor turned counterclockwise. (b) Then, the ac-
tor saw an apple in sight and began tomove in a straight line.
(c) Finally, the actor reached the apple after adjusting its di-
rection of movement. (d) The probability of the actor’s in-
tention ι2 was estimated by the PublicSelf model. Themodel
increased the probability as soon as the actor moved toward
the apple.
to estimate the observer’s inference. The PublicSelf model can take
into account the fact that the observer does not know what exists in
the right field. Thus, we could obtain the result that the probabilities
of ιa and ιp were even.
5 COMPARISONWITH PEOPLE’S JUDGMENT
FROM OBSERVER’S PERSPECTIVE
5.1 Experiment settings
In order to verify whether it is possible to use the PublicSelf model
to actually comprehend people’s utterances, we conducted an ex-
periment to compare the inferences of the PublicSelf model with the
judgments of people who actually observed the agent’s behavior
from the observer’s perspective.
In this experiment, we prepared six episodes, including the ones
shown in subsection 4.3. The six episodes could be classified into
three types: simple, blind, and misleading. The simple type included
episode 1. In the simple episodes, the actor soon caught sight of
its target and headed directly for it. There were fewer factors for
the participants to consider than in the episodes of the other types.
The blind type included episode 3. The actor seemed to head for
something, but the observer could not observe the object toward
which the actor was heading. Themisleading type included episodes
(a) t = 1 (b) t = 32
(c) t = 48 (d) probability
Figure 5: The actor showed misleading behavior in episode
2. (a) The policy of the actor was trained to get a pear, but
the actor first began moving toward the apples. (b) The ac-
tor changed its direction to the opposite side. (c) The actor
moved to the right. The observer could not observe what
the actor was moving toward. (d) The PublicSelf model first
inferred that it was more likely that the actor intended to
get an apple when the actor approached the apple. Then,
the probability decreased as the actor turned to the opposite
side.
2 and 4 (Fig. 7). There the actor showed misleading behavior by first
heading for either apples or pears, but ignored them and moved
in a different direction. Misleading behavior often appears when
the actor does not catch the actor’s target in sight and searches for
it. Each type had two episodes. The actor’s policy was πa in one
episode, and πp in the other.
Participants watched videos from the observer’s view frame by
frame, and were asked to estimate the probability of the agent’s
intention for every frame on web browsers (Fig. 8). The participants
watched the eight episodes in a randomized order. When the actor
spawned in the observer’s sight at the beginning of each episode, a
red arrow indicated the direction of the actor.
The participants were 11 undergraduate and graduate students,
eight male and three female.
Before the experiment, instructions were given to the partici-
pants. An experimenter first showed the participants the whole
area of the field, the observable areas of the observer and actor,
and the appearance of the actor. Then, the participants received
an explanation of the use of the user interface, and were given
four points to note for the experiment as follows: (i) There were
always one actor, two apples, and two pears on the field. (ii) The
only possible intentions for the actor were either ιa or ιp . (iii) The
(a) t = 1 (b) t = 1 (actor’s perspective)
(c) t = 10 (d) probability
Figure 6: Episode 3. In this episode, there was an apple at the
middle of observer’s perspective. In addition, there was an
apple and two pears at the bottom right of the field, which
the observer could not observe. (a) First, the actor faced the
upper-right area and began turning clockwise. (b) An apple
and two pears were in the sight of the actor at a time point
t = 1, but could not be seen from the observer’s perspective.
(c) The actor went toward the apple at the bottom right of
the field, and disappeared from the observer’s perspective.
(d) The PublicSelf model observer could estimate the actor’s
intention because the observer did not know what the actor
was moving toward.
Figure 7: Actor’s behavior in episode 4. The actor appeared
from the right and moved to the left, passing by a pear. The
actor twice moved toward the pear but soon changed di-
rection, which could also mislead the mind-reading partic-
ipants.
Figure 8: User interface for participants. Participants indi-
cated the probability bymoving a slider. The sentences were
in Japanese in the actual experiment.
actor did not know where the fruits were on the field at the begin-
ning of each episode. (iv) The initial positions of the actor and the
fruits were randomly determined at the beginning of each episode
independently of the actor’s intention. Instruction (iv) was given
so that the participants considered the initial probabilities of the
actor’s intention to be even.
In spite of instruction (iv), two female participants related the
actor’s spawn points to the actor’s intention. In other words, they
thought that it was more likely that the actor intended to get an ap-
ple when the actor just spawned in front of an apple. This suggests
that a situation alone can have a strong influence on people’s mind-
reading even if the behavior of the actor had not been observed.
In order to consider the inference of an actor’s intention from the
actor’s actions, however, the two participants were excluded from
the analysis in this paper. Considering the influence of the situation
is one direction for future work.
5.2 Results
Figure 9 shows the relationship between the probabilities estimated
by the PublicSelf model and participants in episodes of the simple
type. There was a strong and significant correlation (r = 0.90)
between the estimation of the probability estimations.
In the blind episodes, the PublicSelf estimated that the proba-
bilities were even at every step. However, in episode 2, three par-
ticipants estimated that the actor had intention ιp with a higher
probability after the actor began to move to the right of the field (Fig
10). One of the participants explained that he estimated the prob-
ability of ιp higher because the actor seemed to find its target on
the right of the field, where a pear existed with a higher probability
than an apple, because an apple already existed in the middle of the
field. This is a logical inference, but it was impossible for the actor
to infer the participants’ thought in the settings of this experiment
because the actor had never observed the apple at the center of
the field and did not know that the apple was there. Information
asymmetry between an actor and observer can sometimes cause
this kind of insoluble problem.
Figure 9: Comparison of probabilities that actor has inten-
tion ιa estimated by PublicSelf model and people in simple
episodes. Each dot represents an answer of a participant and
the PublicSelf model in a step. There was a strong and sig-
nificant correlation between the people and the PublicSelf
model.
Figure 10: Estimated probability that actor had intention ιa
for each step in episode 3. Error bars show standard devia-
tions of people’s answers in a step.
Figure 11 shows the probabilities estimated by both people and
the PublicSelf model in the misleading episodes. There was a signif-
icant but not strong correlation (r = 0.46). There were two possible
factors that led to the gaps between the estimations by the people
and PublicSelf model.
One factor was that the people fed back the agent’s behavior to
the inference of the actor’s beliefs. When the actor changed direc-
tion, some participants let out a gasp of astonishment and reported
that it seemed the actor did not notice that the pear was there or
was losing sight of the pear. In our implementation, the update of
the actor’s belief was deterministic, but people fed back the actor’s
behavior to the inference of the actor’s belief. A probabilistic infer-
ence of the actor’s belief could narrow the gap between the model
and people.
Another possible factor is that the participants could have sus-
pected the intentionality of the actor’s behavior. In both of the
misleading episodes, the actor much more frequently chose the
action "do nothing" or alternatively selected the actions "turn clock-
wise" and "turn counterclockwise" compared to the simple episodes.
Because πa and πp were probabilistic, the actor sometimes, espe-
cially when it did not find its target, lost consistency and rationality
of behavior. In a questionnaire, some participants indicated that
they felt anxious when the actor showed such inconsistent and
irrational behaviors and found it difficult to choose from the two
(a) Episode 2 (b) Episode 4
Figure 11: There were gaps in the probabilities estimated by
the people and PublicSelf model in the misleading episodes.
In episode 2 (left), the probability of the people’s estima-
tion declinedmuchmore quickly than that of the PublicSelf
model. In episode 4 (right), the probability of the people’s
estimation did not become 1.0 despite the fact that the actor
seemingly ignored a pear, knowing that the pear was at the
bottom of the field.
alternatives ιa and ιp . The rationality of an agent is a necessary
requirement for people to consider the agent to be an entity to
which they can attribute mental states [10]. The participants might
have doubted the assumption that the actor had either intention
ιa or ιp and answered with a probability of approximately fifty-
fifty after losing confidence on their answers. The confidence of
people’s judgments could also be related to whether they used
context-dependent expressions for the actor. Thus, it should be
important to consider the strength of the intentionality that people
feel from the actor’s behavior, as well as the probabilities of the
candidates for the actor’s intention.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposed the PublicSelf model, which is a model of an actor
that infers the mental states that an observer watching the actor’s
behavior attributes to the actor. We implemented the PublicSelf
model for an actor that learned its policy by deep reinforcement
learning in a simulated environment. Verification of the PublicSelf
model showed that the model could infer the attributed intention of
the agent in scenes where people could feel a certain intentionality
from the actor’s behavior.
Our simulation has limitations such as people’s eyesight is fixed
and predefined, which can be problematic toward the application of
the PublicSelf model to real-world scenario.We are planning further
investigation into the implementation of the PublicSelf model for a
real-world robot. Moreover, the experiment suggested that the RL
agent’s intentionality had an effect on people. An investigation of
people’s cognitive process in understanding an RL agent’s behavior
is important future work for the realization of effective human
RL-agent interaction.
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